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Ten years ago, when commenting on the accession of China to theWorld Trade Organization (WTO), Mike Moore, then Director Generalof the Organization, was predicting “a historic moment for the WTO,
for China, and for international economic co-operation.” (1) Even so, none of
the brilliant economic forecasts of that time was able to gauge the magni-
tude of the China trade revolution. (2)
The great beneficiary 
Miracle or threat, China’s trade growth and its impact on the world are
now part of every economic conversation. (3) Evidence of this dramatic
change is given by astonishing trade figures. From US$249.2 billion in 2000,
at the eve of the WTO accession, Chinese merchandise exports have in-
creased to $1,577.8 billion in 2010. (4) China is exporting to every single re-
gion of the world, with a spectacular merchandise trade growth with Latin
America (from $5.7 billion in 2000 to $69.9 billion in 2010) and Africa (from
$4.9 billion in 2000 to $58.1 billion in 2010). Although far less impressive,
the China ascendancy in trade in commercial services is also perceptible.
With 4.6 percent of the world trade in commercial services in 2010, China
occupies the fourth global position, right after India and before Japan. (5)
While Chinese exports are skyrocketing, Chinese merchandises imports are
also steadily increasing (from $7.2 billion in 2000 to $106.9 billion in 2010).
China’s imports in natural resource products are indeed booming, and so
are its investments as a strategic need to sustain its growth. (6) Moreover,
the trade deficit registered by the EU or the US should be put in perspective,
as it is partly due to the exportation of goods produced in China by Amer-
ican or European subsidiaries. Not to mention that the China trade greatly
benefits from an exchange rate policy perceived as unfair by its main trading
partners, including emerging economies such as Brazil, which has recently
submitted a proposal to the WTO arguing in favour of contingent protection
measures against imports from countries favoured by undervalued exchange
rates. (7)
Despite all these analytical precautions, one can only resort to a now com-
monly accepted analysis, that of China trade hyper-growth and possible
dominance to come. As shown by the table reproduced below, China will,
in all likelihood, dominate the trade universe in the next 20 years.
Countries’ share of world trade and GDP
growth
According to these economic forecasts, China, which accounted for 10
percent of the world trade in merchandise in 2010, will account for nearly
15 percent by 2030, and its trade will represent more than double that of
the US and quadruple that of Germany. This dynamism will both benefit
from and participate in the dramatic rise of intra-Asian trade to such an ex-
tent that the gravity centre of trade will shift from the US and Europe to
Asia. (8)
But what else would this imply for China and the world? In early 2002,
just as China joined the WTO, the CEFC released two special issues of China
Perspectives dedicated to this already fascinating evolution. Ten years later,
a number of leading trade experts from academia and practice have ac-
cepted our invitation to reflect upon China’s participation in the WTO and
how this has changed – or not – the Chinese legal framework and practice
as well as international trade and the Organization itself.
A state capitalist in global trade
As demonstrated in this special issue, a few trends are already perceptible:
intensified business concerns (9) over an uneven playing field generated by
the unsatisfactory implementation of key WTO commitments such as
transparency, uniform application, and judicial review (Leïla Choukroune,
Hubert Bazin), increasing tensions over the protection of intellectual prop-
erty rights (Bryan Mercurio, Rogier Creemers), impaired market access (Hu-
bert Bazin), societal concerns in relation to the “human dimension of
international trade” and, for instance, the food safety issue (Denise Pre-
vost), access to information and censorship (Rogier Creemers), export re-
strictions and increase of the number of complex trade disputes (Leïla
Choukroune), and the role played by China in global trade negotiations
(Henry Gao).
All these concrete trade cases have a direct impact on China and the
world, but if China has become a global trader it also remains a “state cap-
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italist” and as such an intriguing partner, (10) if not a direct cause of anxiety
for the international community. The China miracle is also that of an un-
paralleled country that has been able to abide by the rules while playing
with them. The apparent conformity of the Chinese model with interna-
tional rules hides a much more complex situation in which the state is am-
biguously engaged in the economy. This may not be completely new, as
many other countries, including the EU and the US, have by no means em-
braced a pure liberal capitalist model, but the China paradigm nevertheless
remains unique in its reach and implications. Indeed, over the past 30 years,
China’s GDP has grown at an average rate of 9.5 percent a year and its in-
ternational trade by 18 percent in volume. (11) From holding shares in the
biggest companies to SOEs’ foreign direct investment in strategic resources
and specific loans and currency policies, the Chinese state is present in every
sector and at every level of the economy. So why is this rise coinciding with
a certain liberal capitalism crisis, and what does it tell China’s competitors?
It may be that the current policies of the US and the EU and, for instance,
their industrial policies have to be revised in a critical manner against the
free market dogma of the 1980s and 1990s. The world will have to count
China in, and so will it have to reconsider the role of the state in the econ-
omy in order to better balance different actors’ interests and create a level
playing field for Beijing and other emerging economies. In doing so, the
WTO will matter, but so will the many Foreign Trade Agreements (FTA) (12)
that countries are now adopting on a bilateral and regional basis. The com-
plexity of the trade scenario will only strengthen the need for political vig-
ilance and clarification of the state’s objectives for economic development.
As long as China’s trade growth will not benefit all equally, and the Chinese
population to start with, this transformation will demand not only admira-
tion, but also legitimate concern.
10. See “The Rise of State Capitalism, The Emerging World’s New Model,” The Economist, January
2012, pp. 21-27. 
11. For further details, see Table 2 - China Main Economic Indicators.
12. See Wang Guiguo, “China’s FTAs: Legal Characteristics and Implications,” American Journal of In-
ternational Law, vol. 105, no. 3, July 2011.
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Country/group Growth
2010 2030 2010-2030 2010 2030 2010 2030
United States 3,224 5,827 3.0% 10.6% 7.3% 22.0% 24.3%
Japan 1,460 2,586 2.9% 4.8% 3.2% 26.8% 35.2%
China 2,972 11,972 7.2% 9.8% 15.0% 50.6% 53.4%
India 539 3,907 10.4% 1.8% 4.9% 35.1% 46.4%
Korea 892 2,617 5.5% 2.9% 3.3% 88.5% 120.5%
Brazil 384 991 4.9% 1.3% 1.2% 18.3% 21.4%
Indonesia 136 993 10.5% 0.4% 1.2% 19.2% 34.0%
Russia 648 890 1.6% 2.1% 1.1% 44.3% 43.3%
Germany 2,318 2,918 1.2% 7.6% 3.7% 89.7% 76.0%
WORLD 30,387 79,905 5.0% 100.0% 100.0% 48.7% 57.2%
Table 1 – Countries’ share of world trade and GDP growth
Table 2 – China Main Economic Indicators
Source: Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China's Economic Dominance, Washington, Peterson Institute of International Economics, 2011.
Trade (US$ billion) Share in world trade Trade to GDP
BASIC INDICATORS
Population (thousands, 2010) 1 338 300
GDP (million current US$, 2010) 5 878 629
GDP (million current PPP US$, 2010) 10 084 764
Current account balance (million US$, 2010) 305 370
Trade per capita (US$, 2008-2010) 2 135
Trade to GDP ratio (2008-2010) 55.4
2010
Real GDP (2005=100) 170
Exports of goods and services (volume, 2005=100) 180
Imports of goods and services (volume, 2005=100) 168
Rank in world trade, 2010 Exports Imports
Merchandise 1 2
excluding intra-EU trade 2 3
Commercial services 4 3
excluding intra-EU trade 3 3
2005-2010 2009 2010
11 9 10
12 -10 25
11 4 17
Annual percentage change
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2005-2010 2009 2010
16 -16 31
16 -11 39
Annual 
percentage
change
2005-2010 2009 2010
18 -12 32
18 0 22
Annual 
percentage
change
TRADE POLICY
WTO accession 11 December 2001
Trade Policy Review 31 May, 2 June 2010
GPA accession Observer
Tariff binding coverage (%) 100
Contribution to WTO budget (%, 2011) 6.878
Import duties collected (%, 2006-2008)
in total tax revenue 3
to total imports 1.9
Number of notifications to WTO and measures in force
Outstanding notifications in WTO Central Registry 12
Goods RTAs - services EIAs notified to WTO 9-Aug
Anti-dumping (30 June 2010) 119
Countervailing duties (30 June 2010) 1
Safeguards (22 October 2010) 0
Number of disputes (complainant - defendant) 
Requests for consultation Aug-22
Original panel / Appellate Body (AB) reports 4-May
Compliance panel / AB reports (Article 21.5 DSU) 0 - 0
Arbitration awards (Article 22.6 DSU) 0 - 0
Tariffs and duty free imports
MFN tariffs Final bound Applied 2010
Simple average of import duties
All goods 10 9.6
Agricultural goods (AOA) 15.7 15.6
Non-agricultural goods 9.2 8.7
Non ad-valorem duties (% total tariff lines) 0 0.5
MFN duty free imports (%, 2009)
in agricultural goods (AOA) 0.9 0.9
in non-agricultural goods 50.6
Services sectors with GATS commitments 93
MERCHANDISE TRADE 2010
Merchandise exports, f.o.b. (million US$) 1 577 824
Merchandise imports, c.i.f. (million US$) 1 395 099
COMMERCIAL SERVICES TRADE 2010
Commercial services exports (million US$) 170 248
Commercial services imports (million US$) 192 174
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 
Patent grants by patent office, 2009
Residents Non-residents Total
65 391 63 098 128 489
Direct residents Direct non-residents Madrid Total
65 391 63 098 12 934 818 633
Trademark registrations by office, 2009
2010
Share in world total exports 10.36
Breakdown in economy's total exports
By main commodity group (ITS)
Agricultural products 3.3
Fuels and mining products 3
Manufactures 93.6
By main destination
1. European Union (27) 19.7
2. United States 18
3. Hong Kong, China 13.8
4. Japan 7.7
5. Korea, Republic of 4.4
2010
Share in world total exports 4.61
Breakdown in economy's total exports
By principal services item
Transportation 20.1
Travel 26.9
Other commercial services 53
2010
Share in world total imports 5.47
Breakdown in economy's total imports
By principal services item
Transportation 32.9
Travel 28.6
Other commercial services 38.5
2010
Share in world total imports 9.06
Breakdown in economy's total imports
By main commodity group (ITS)
Agricultural products 7.8
Fuels and mining products 26.7
Manufactures 64.1
By main origin
1. Japan 12.6
2. European Union (27) 12
3. Korea, Republic of 9.9
4. Taipei, Chinese 8.3
5. China 7.6
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Source: http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfiles/CN_E.htm
